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| Ethics and Decision Making
in Human Organizations PowerPoint Presentation:
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ETHICS AND IMPROVING ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP/MANAGEMENT PRACTICE "[To] do this to
the right person, to the right extent, at the right time,
In the middle of these organizational messes, thoughtful managers and leaders—precisely because they are rational, good people—endeavor to make decisions that will maximize the attainment of organizational goals (i.e., the good—or, end—to be pursued) while minimizing organizational dysfunction (i.e., the evil—or, unhappiness—to be avoided). A perspective on ethical practice When managers and leaders inquire into the right thing, "...we are inquiring not in order to know what virtue is," Aristotle notes in his Ethics, "but in order to become good....[human agents] do not fall under any art [i.e., technique or skill] or precept [i.e., theory] but the agents themselves must in each case consider what is appropriate to the occasion [i.e., practice]..." (italics added, Ethics II.2, p. 183). For Aristotle, ethical practice is not a series of norms to be imposed as a template upon people but is, rather, a discursive activity whereby an individual struggles to integrate theoretical notions about what is truly good with technical skills that have proven themselves capable of attaining the good. The ethical thing, then, is the practical thing and is comprised of three elements. The first element of ethical practice is knowledge. For Aristotle, knowledge includes data are both factual (i.e., what the case truly is) as well as theoretical (i.e., what the good truly is). Knowledge is acquired, for example, as managers and leaders use quantitative and qualitative research techniques to assess what is transpiring in their organizations as well as by considering what experts suggest the case ought to be (e.g., as managers and leaders read books). This knowledge, in turn, provides managers and leaders a framework for deliberating about the most appropriate technique(s) by which the good can be attained in their organization. Ethical practice requires a second element: possession of the skills (or techniques) necessary to achieve the desired good. To act ethically, Aristotle maintains that individuals must be experienced and proficient in those skills associated with best practice. As an individual hones these skills—perhaps by engaging a mentor to work through typical problems associated with failure and to develop the skills attributed with success, muddling through training exercises, or simply by immersing oneself in one’s responsibilities—individuals hone the techniques of best practice. Well-honed techniques are like arrows in a hunter’s quiver, that is, they comprise an arsenal of proven and reliable skills that can be called upon to solve problems as they arise in practice. Most importantly, however, an Aristotelian perspective of ethical practice entails a third element: deliberation. It is not enough for an individual to know what is good or to have at one’s disposal an arsenal of proven skills and techniques. To act ethically, one must give careful consideration to those ideas concerning the good and then freely select a course of action from among equally plausible alternatives for which one bears personal responsibility. What to an outsider appears to be a rote and routine decision-making process is, for the expert, a result of intense practice and discipline that culminates in a sustained focus which directs the individual’s mind and body to respond appropriately and responsibly to the unique situation presenting itself. For Aristotle, then, an individual’s choice is ethical when it integrates a rational principal with a practical technique through discursive thought. And, when an individual enacts this choice , the course of action brings about the greatest amount of good for which the individual bears personal responsibility (Ethics III.3, p. 202). As far as these notions impact organizational management and leadership, ethical practice is not demonstrated by managers and leaders who know what is good and ought to be done, those people who dictate nostrums to fellow workers, for example, concerning what the case ought to be. Nor is ethical practice evident when managers or leaders enact routine managerial or leadership skills inculcated in training programs, without knowing the facts of the situation in which they find themselves immersed. Neither is ethical practice discovered in verbal commitments to some good, for example, advocating continuous quality improvement and superior customer service, devoid of a personal commitment to inculcating the good in actual practice. In contrast to these three behaviors, a manager’s or leader’s ethical practice—from a distinctively Aristotelian perspective—makes itself evident through the manager’s or leader’s character as that person selects a course of action that proceeds "from a firm and unchangeable character" (Ethics II.4, p. 187). When, for example, a manager or leader is confronted by a dilemma and makes a decision about "what is appropriate to the occasion," this individual’s ethical practice manifests itself, Aristotle asserts, in a virtuous character evidenced in the results of one's decision-making practice, that is, practical wisdom. It isn’t so much what the manager or leader does that is crucial for ethical decision making as it is why the manager or leader does what one does and the quality of character revealed in the manager’s or leader’s practical decisions. The ethical manager or leader, then, is a person who not only possesses wisdom theoretically but also expresses it in very practical ways. Aristotle’s proposition of the "Golden Mean" Taking a cue from this reality, those who teach organization theory have exposed their students to theoretical notions concerning what characterizes good organizations and to train their students in techniques of best practice that appear to foster organizational development. By applying the scientific paradigm to organizational life, those who teach organization theory have related abstract theory with concrete skills in the hope that their students, once they are ensconced in managerial or leadership positions in the organizational hierarchy, will do things right—as organizational theorists has defined it. For their part, too, many students who take introductory organization theory courses struggle to do things right by miming back what their professors state or what students read in textbooks and articles. From a philosophical perspective, this caricature depicts professors and students who fail to confront the fundamental ethical question raised in managerial and leadership practice: What is the right thing to do? (Sergiovanni, 1990). For teachers and students of organizational theory, Aristotle roots his paradigm in actual practice rather than in theoretical ideas or technical skills. Whereas his teacher, Plato, sought to direct the human will toward eternal truths, Aristotle, on the other hand, argued that decisions about the right thing to do is an eminently practical matter, a choice one can select from along seven continua of possible excessive and defective virtues, including courage, liberality, magnificence, pride, anger, truth, and indignation. These are the virtues manifest in the character of managers and leaders who makes ethical decisions. Take the virtue of courage (Ethics II.7, p. 191), for example. It would seem rather obvious that aspiring managers and leaders should be taught about courage as well as how to act courageously, for the good of their organization and everyone associated with it depends upon the manager or leader standing for something (Sergiovanni, 1992). Aristotle reminds his readers, however, that "courage" is located somewhere along a continuum of possible expressions of courage. Furthermore, depending upon the idiosyncratic circumstances in which a manager or leader is immersed, this mean is located somewhere between a defect, fear, and an excess, confidence. For Aristotle, it is not enough to require that managers or leaders act courageously, as if there is one and only one way to express this virtue in actual practice. In some cases, it would be important that a manager or leader experience fear and treads carefully, factoring her fear and trepidation into her deliberations about what she ought to do. The opposite situation might also be the case. That is, a manager or leader might be overly fearful of something, becoming paralyzed in one's ability to act courageously. Thus, while some might think that fear is an impediment to courageous action, Aristotle points out that fear can (and perhaps should) influence one’s deliberations. But, extreme fear is a defect, debilitating to ethical practice. At the opposite end of the continuum is another aspect of courage, "confidence." Confident managers and leaders act with a sense of calm assurance that what they are doing is the right thing to do. Contrast these managers and leaders with those who exude supreme confidence, acting with complete assurance when, in point of fact, such self-confidence unwarranted. Like its opposite, fear, confidence can influence a manager’s and leader's deliberations about what she ought to do in a particular situation, positively or negatively. Thus, while some might argue that confidence is a prerequisite to courageous action, Aristotle argues that exuberance is an excess about which managers and leaders ought to be concerned because this expression of confidence is debilitating to ethical practice. As a consequence, Aristotle reminds his readers that the virtue of courage is a very practical matter, one that can be expressed in at least four different ways, the most appropriate expression resulting from deliberation. Stated in another way, to be courageous is the consequence of a careful calculation about what good is being sought in a troubling dilemma and the course of action that best resolves the conflicting values manifesting themselves in that dilemma. For managers and leader, then, the virtuous thing to do is not to act courageously as if there exists only one courageous way to act. Rather, acting courageously requires managers and leaders to balance the conflicting and contradicting aspects of courage—fear and confidence—enacting the most appropriate mean, given factual circumstances. As Aristotle discusses this matter:
Aristotle maintains that six other virtues are equally bounded by vice, one form revealing an excess in one’s character while the other reveals a defect. Liberality, for example, can degenerate into prodigality or meanness (Ethics II.7, pp. 191-192; IV.1, pp. 210-215); magnificence can be polluted by vulgarity or niggardliness (Ethics IV.2, pp. 215-218); pride is bounded by vanity and humility (Ethics II.7, p. 192; IV.3, pp. 218-223); anger by irascibility and equanimity (Ethics II.7, p. 192; IV.1, pp. 210-214); truth is destroyed through an excess, boasting, or a defect, modesty (Ethics II.7, p. 193; IV.7, p. 193); and, indignation lies somewhere between envy and spite (Ethics II.7, pp. 193-194). Each continuum displays the extreme expressions of a particular virtue, whereby the excesses and defects stand in opposition not only to each other but also to the mean. These seven virtues and their possible combinations along each continuum—as they are enacted by managers and leaders and exhibited in a virtuous character—distinguish ethical practice. Aristotle reminds his readers that it is no easy task to find the mean "but to do this to the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, with the right motive, and in the right way, that is not for every one nor is it easy; wherefore goodness is both rare and laudable and noble" (Ethics II.9, p. 195). The philosopher’s interest is that ethical practice influence and shape events in the real world in order that real people may experience true happiness. To be truly happy, therefore, one must act virtuously, that is, to experience the virtues "at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way" (Ethics II.6, p. 190). Ethical practice, then, is an exercise of the intellect and will as managers and leaders meld ideas about what virtue requires with the skills of best practice and direct these efforts toward the attainment of virtue in concrete circumstances. By engaging in ethical practice, managers and leaders express their excellence as rational creatures (Ethics I.13, p. 179). Some challenges for teaching and learning organizational theory
Aristotle’s paradigm of ethical practice challenges those who teach organization theory to inquire: "Is a good manager or leader developed by the study of textbooks, through reflection upon practice, or is good management or leadership simply a gut-level feeling?" For Aristotle, ethical practice is not an abstract intellectual matter—disconnected from the episodes of practice characterizing day-to-day life in organizations—the matter of textbooks. Nor is it ethical practice a faculty, a skill, or a technique learned through hard experience or pre-packaged training exercises that can be enacted mechanistically and duplicated across a wide range and variety of organizations. Neither is ethical practice a passionate commitment to some purpose, even if one’s passion is directed toward a good. Envisioning management and leadership as an ethical practice, Aristotle's Ethics challenges students who would like to become managers and leaders to move beyond any programmatic focus that would narrow the curriculum to those theoretical notions abstracted from reality as well as those technical skills alleged to work in reality, that is, doing things right. Ethical practice requires that the scope of the curriculum be widened to include the intellectual and moral formation of the character of future managers and leaders. This formation includes developing the student’s rational capacity, the power to make decisions concerning what is appropriate for each unique situation, that is, doing right things. Undoubtedly, teaching decision making is important; but, of far greater significance from an Aristotelian perspective is that students learn to reflect upon their decision-making process—the why underlying the what managers and leaders do—by examining what virtue requires of them and balancing the conflicting demands that threaten to undermine virtuous action in organizations. However, the direct question "Why did you do that?"—with its interest in qualitative matters and subjective values—presents some practical difficulties. As experienced managers and leaders know all too well, it is much easier to ask a subordinate "What did you do?"—with its quantitative orientation to objective matters—than it is to inquire into another's subjective motivations. For example, when a manager or leader asks a subordinate "Why did you do that?" the subordinate oftentimes interprets the question as an intrusion or perhaps even the precursor of an attack, veiling a negative judgment made by the superior that what the subordinate did was wrongheaded or, worse yet, incorrect. Feeling defensive, the subordinate now isn't quite sure just how to respond to this inquiry. What follows, then, are carefully crafted communications and actions intentionally formulated to protect oneself and one's interests. But, this question might just as well reflect the superior's legitimate interest in expanding one's understanding, an inquiry reflecting a sincere interest on the superior's part to examine data from a perspective that the manager or leader may never have considered. In this instance, the manager or leader is asking the subordinate to expand the perimeters of one's conscious thought process. That is, as the subordinate responds honestly and openly to the question and lays bare one's reasoning, the subordinate expands the superior's decision-making capacity. Indeed, there was no negative judgment and no need for defensiveness in this instance; in fact, there is an active interest in expanding one's practical decision-making capacity. The manager or leader actively seeks to inculcate this learning by inquiring into the subordinate's thought process. From an Aristotelian perspective, "Why did you do that?" is perhaps the most important question managers and leaders can ask. It is a question that inquires not solely into one's actions but more significantly into one's motives. And, when one responds to this question forthrightly and honestly, the respondent exposes one's character, that is, the degree of virtue that is—or is not—present. Perhaps, this explains why so many subordinates find this question so difficult to respond to. Intuitively, the subordinate knows that what is really being asked is not information to vindicate one's judgment but to solicit very personal and intimate information about another's character. Likewise, when a subordinate ask this question of a superior, it can put the manager or leader on the defensive. Or, it can provide the superior an opportunity to express the principles and values—the degree of virtue present (or absent) in the manager's or leader's character—as these were brought to bear in the decision-making process. "Why did you do that?" is perhaps the most important question that can be asked, organizationally speaking. If, as Simon (1945/1997) argues, organizations originate through the coordination of human communication and action, the communications engendered by inquiring into why people do what they do provide the forum through which people articulate the principles or values they identify (or hold) as "virtuous." And, as these principles and virtues become shared virtues and principles, they comprise the purpose animating the organization and the activities transpiring within it (Barnard, 1938/1968; Vaill, 1986, 1989). This is how managers and leaders construct what could be termed "ethical organizations," that is, virtuous people who engage one another in conversations and actions that exhibit doing right things "at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way" (Ethics II.6, p. 190). In sum, Aristotle’s discussion about ethical practice veers away from abstract theories concerning the good as well as skills that enable the good to flourish. By locating ethical practice in practical wisdom—a golden mean—the philosopher challenges those who teach and study organization theory to concern themselves with the real choices that managers and leaders make as well as with those principles by which ethical managers and leaders act, so that when they are confronted by the realities of practice in human organizations, these women and men avoid falling into excess or defect. Of particular import for those who teach organization theory is one implication of Aristotle's thought, namely, that because ethical practice concerns both virtue and living virtuously, ethical practice can be taught and inculcated. The intellectual virtues (for example, pure ideas like courage) are not innate to human creatures; instead, the virtues owe their birth and growth to good teaching. Likewise, acting virtuously is not in-born; instead good professors enable students to learn how to act virtuously and to take delight in doing good. For these reasons, educating students who desire to be managers and leaders in ethical practice requires both experience and time (Ethics II.1, p. 181). In this context, teaching is a fundamental dimension of the formation of future managers and leaders, meriting considerable attention if these women and men are to be taught properly. Aristotle’s purpose for shifting discussion from abstract, intellectual matters and concrete, technical matters to practical matters seems not so much related to his disinterest in the former, for even he argues that ethical practice must not neglect the good as either an idea or as a discipline. Aristotle appears to be more interested in the latter, practical matters, in particular, how ethical decision making is a matter of character and how one's character influences other human beings to become ethical by inculcating into one's own character the qualities of virtue evident in the manager's or leader's character. The critical issue in teaching organization theory, then, is not simply that professors expose their students to theory or share war-stories with their students, but whether professors engage their students in reflective practice where the students reflect upon their experience in organizations and raise the substantive matters dealing with management and leadership theory and skills, all of which will provoke students to decide what ought to be done in actual practice if, as future managers and leaders, these students are to act virtuously. Aristotle’s paradigm challenges those who teach organization theory foursquare: Just how do organization theory courses inculcate the type of authentic deliberation that will enable managers and leaders to do the right things in the real world of actual practice? References
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